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Abstract: We present a combination of raising, explicit variable dependency representation, the liberalized δ-
rule, and preservation of solutions for first-order deductive theorem proving. Our main motivation is to provide the
foundation for our work on inductive theorem proving.
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11 Introduction
The paper organizes as follows: After explaining the technical terms of the title in § 1 and the
remaining basic notions in § 2, we start to explicate the differences between our two versions of
calculi in § 3. The weak version is explained in § 4. The changes necessary for the strong version
in order to admit liberalization of the δ-rule are explained in § 5. After concluding in § 6 we
append all the proofs, references, and notes.
1.1 Without Skolemization
In this paper we discuss how to analytically prove first-order theorems in contexts where Skolem-
ization is not appropriate. Skolemization has at least three problematic aspects.
1. Skolemization enrichs the signature or introduces higher-order variables. Unless special
care is taken, this may introduce objects into empty universes and change the notion of
term-generatedness or Herbrand models. Above that, the Skolem functions occur in an-
swers to goals or solutions of constraints1 which in general cannot be translated into the
original signature. For a detailed discussion of these problems cf. Miller (1992).
2. Skolemization results in the following simplified quantification structure:
For all Skolem functions ~u there are solutions to the free γ-variables ~e (i.e. the
free variables of Fitting (1996)) such that the quantifier-free theorem T (~e, ~u) is
valid.
Short: ∀~u. ∃~e. T (~e, ~u).
Since the state of a proof attempt is often represented as the conjunction of the branches
of a tree (e.g. in sequent or (dual) tableau calculi), the free γ-variables become “rigid” or
“global”, i.e. a solution for a free γ-variable must solve all occurrences of this variable in
the whole proof tree. This is because, for B0, . . . , Bn denoting the branches of the proof
tree,
∀~u. ∃~e. ( B0 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn )
is logically strictly stronger than ∀~u. ( ∃~e. B0 ∧ . . . ∧ ∃~e. Bn )
2Moreover, with this quantification structure it does not seem to be possible to do inductive
theorem proving by finding, for each assumed counterexample, another counterexample
that is strictly smaller in some wellfounded ordering.2 The reason for this is the following.
When we have some counterexample ~u for T (~e, ~u) (i.e. there is no ~e such that T (~e, ~u) is
valid) then for different ~e different branches Bi in the proof tree may cause the invalidity
of the conjunction. If we have applied induction hypotheses in more than one branch, for
different ~e we get different smaller counterexamples. What we would need, however, is one
single smaller counterexample for all ~e.
3. Skolemization increases the size of the formulas. (Note that in most calculi the only relevant
part of Skolem terms is the top symbol and the set of occurring variables.)
The first and second problematic aspects disappear when one uses raising (cf. Miller (1992))
instead of Skolemization. Raising is a dual of Skolemization and simplifies the quantification
structure to something like:
There are raising functions ~e such that for all possible values of the free δ-vari-
ables ~u (i.e. the nullary constants or “parameters”) the quantifier-free theorem T (~e, ~u)
is valid.
Short: ∃~e. ∀~u. T (~e, ~u).
Note that due to the two duality switches “unsatisfiability/validity” and “Skolemization/
raising”, in this paper raising will look much like Skolemization in refutational theorem proving.
The inverted order of universal and existential quantification of raising (compared to Skolemiza-
tion) is advantageous because now
∃~e. ∀~u. ( B0 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn )
is indeed logically equivalent to ∃~e. ( ∀~u. B0 ∧ . . . ∧ ∀~u. Bn ).
Furthermore, inductive theorem proving works well: When, for some ~e, we have some counter-
example ~u for T (~e, ~u) (i.e. T (~e, ~u) is invalid) then one branch Bi in the proof tree must cause
the invalidity of the conjunction. If this branch is closed, then it contains the application of an
induction hypothesis that is invalid for this ~e and the ~u′ resulting from the instantiation of the
hypothesis. Thus, ~u′ together with the induction hypothesis provides the strictly smaller counter-
example we are searching for for this ~e.
The third problematic aspect disappears when the dependency of variables is explicitly rep-
resented in a variable-condition, cf. Kohlhase (1995). This idea actually has a long history, cf.
Prawitz (1960), Kanger (1963), Bibel (1987). Moreover, the use of variable-conditions admits the
free existential variables to be first-order.
31.2 Sequent and Tableau Calculi
In Smullyan (1968), rules for analytic theorem proving are classified as α-, β-, γ-, and δ-rules
independently from a concrete calculus.
α-rules describe the simple and the
β-rules the case-splitting propositional proof steps.
γ-rules show existential properties, either by exhibiting a term witnessing to the existence or else
by introducing a special kind of variable, called “dummy” in Prawitz (1960) and Kanger
(1963), and “free variable” in footnote 11 of Prawitz (1960) and in Fitting (1996). We will
call these variables free γ-variables. By the use of free γ-variables we can delay the choice
of a witnessing term until the state of the proof attempt gives us more information which
choice is likely to result in a successful proof. It is the important addition of free γ-vari-
ables that makes the major difference between the free variable calculi of Fitting (1996) and
the calculi of Smullyan (1968). Since there use to be infinitely many possibly witnessing
terms (and different branches may need different ones), the γ-rules (under assistance of the
β-rules) often destroy the possibility to decide validity because they enable infinitely many
γ-rule applications to the same formula.
δ-rules show universal properties simply with the help of a new symbol, called a “parameter”,
about which nothing is known. Since the present free γ-variables must not be instantiated
with this new parameter, in the standard framework of Skolemization and unification the
parameter is given the present free γ-variables as arguments. In this paper, however, we
will use nullary parameters, which we call free δ-variables. These variables are not free in
the sense that they may be chosen freely, but in the sense that they are not bound by any
quantifier. Our free δ-variables are similar to the parameters of Kanger (1963) because a
free γ-variable may not be instantiated with all of them. We will store the information on
the dependency between free γ-variables and free δ-variables in variable-conditions.
41.3 Preservation of Solutions
Users even of pure Prolog are not so much interested in theorem proving as they are in answer
computation. The theorem they want to prove usually contains some free existential variables
that are instantiated during a proof attempt. When the proof attempt is successful, not only the
input theorem is known to be valid but also the instance of the theorem with the substitution
built-up during the proof. Since the knowledge of mere existence is much less useful than the
knowledge of a term that witnesses to this existence (unless this term is a only free existential
variable), theorem proving should—if possible—always provide these witnessing terms. Answer
computation is no problem in Prolog’s Horn logic because it is so simple. But also for the more
difficult clausal logic, answer computation is possible. Cf. e.g. Baumgartner &al. (1997), where
tableau calculi are used for answer computation in clausal logic. Answer computation becomes
even harder when we consider full first-order logic instead of clausal logic. When δ-steps occur
in a proof, the introduced free universal variables may provide no information on what kind of
object they denote. Their excuse may be that they cannot do this in terms of computability or
λ-terms. Nevertheless, they can provide this information in form of Hilbert’s ε-terms, and the
strong versions of our calculi will do so. When full first-order logic is considered, one should
focus on preservation of solutions instead of computing answers. By this we mean at least the
following property:
All solutions that transform a proof attempt for a proposition into a closed proof (i.e.
the closing substitutions for the free γ-variables) are also solutions of the original
proposition.
This again is closely related to inductive theorem proving: Suppose that we finally have shown
that for the reduced form R(~e, ~u) (i.e. the state of the proof attempt) of the original theorem
T (~e, ~u) (cf. the discussion in § 1.1), there is some solution ~e such that for each counterexample ~u
of R(~e, ~u) there is a counterexample ~u′ for the original theorem and that this ~u′ is strictly smaller
than ~u in some wellfounded ordering. In this case we have proved T (~e, ~u) only if the solution ~e
for the reduced form ∀~u. R(~e, ~u) is also a solution for the original theorem ∀~u. T (~e, ~u).
51.4 The Liberalized δ-rule
We use ‘⊎’ for the union of disjoint classes and ‘id’ for the identity function. For a class R we
define domain, range, and restriction to and image3 and reverse-image of a class A by
dom(R) := {a | ∃b. (a, b)∈R} ;
ran(R) := {b | ∃a. (a, b)∈R} ;
A↿R := {(a, b)∈R | a∈A} ;
〈A〉R := {b | ∃a∈A. (a, b)∈R} ;
R〈B〉 := {a | ∃b∈B. (a, b)∈R} .
We define a sequent to be a list of formulas.4 The conjugate of a formula A (written: A ) is the
formula B if A is of the form ¬B, and the formula ¬A otherwise. Note that the conjugate of the
conjugate of a formula is the original formula again, unless it has the form ¬¬B.
In the tradition of Gentzen (1935) we assume the symbols for free γ-variables (i.e. the free
variables of Fitting (1996)), free δ-variables (i.e. nullary parameters), bound variables (i.e. vari-
ables for quantified use only), and the constants (i.e. the function (and predicate) symbols from
the signature) to come from four disjoint sets Vγ, Vδ, Vbound, and Σ. We assume each of Vγ, Vδ,
Vbound to be infinite (for each sort) and set Vfree := Vγ⊎Vδ. Moreover, due to the possibility to
rename bound variables w.l.o.g., we do not permit quantification on variables that occur already
bound in a formula; i.e. e.g. ∀x:A is only a formula in our sense if A does not contain a quantifier
on x like ∀x or ∃x. The simple effect is that our γ- and δ-rules can simply replace all occurrences
of x. For a term, formula, sequent Γ &c., ‘Vγ(Γ )’, ‘Vδ(Γ )’, ‘Vbound(Γ )’, ‘Vfree(Γ )’ denote the sets
of variables from Vγ, Vδ, Vbound, Vfree occurring in Γ , resp.. For a substitution σ we denote with
‘Γσ’ the result of replacing in Γ each variable x in dom(σ) with σ(x). Unless stated otherwise,
we tacitly assume that each substitution σ satisfies Vbound(dom(σ) ∪ ran(σ)) = ∅, such that no
bound variables can be replaced and no additional variables become bound (i.e. captured) when
applying σ.
A variable-condition R is a subset of Vγ × Vδ. Roughly speaking, (xγ, yδ)∈R says that xγ is
older than yδ, so that we must not instantiate the free γ-variable xγ with a term containing yδ.
While the benefit of the introduction of free γ-variables in γ-rules is to delay the choice of
a witnessing term, it is sometimes unsound to instantiate such a free γ-variable xγ with a term
containing a free δ-variable yδ that was introduced later than xγ:
6Example 1.1
∃x. ∀y. (x= y)
is not deductively valid. We can start a proof attempt via:
γ-step:
∀y. (xγ= y).
δ-step:
(xγ= yδ).
Now, if we were allowed to substitute the free γ-variable xγ with the free δ-variable yδ, we would
get the tautology (yδ= yδ), i.e. we would have proved an invalid formula. In order to prevent
this, the δ-step has to record (xγ, yδ) in the variable-condition, which disallows the instantiation
step.
In order to restrict the possible instantiations as little as possible, we should keep our variable-
conditions as small as possible. Kanger (1963) and Bibel (1987) are quite generous in that they
let their variable-conditions become quite big:
Example 1.2
∃x.
(
P(x) ∨ ∀y. ¬P(y)
)
can be proved the following way:
γ-step: (
P(xγ) ∨ ∀y. ¬P(y)
)
.
α-step:
P(xγ), ∀y. ¬P(y).
δ-step:
P(xγ), ¬P(yδ).
Instantiation step:
P(yδ), ¬P(yδ).
The last step is not allowed in the above citations, so that another γ-step must be applied to the
original formula in order to prove it. Our instantiation step, however, is perfectly sound: Since xγ
does not occur in ∀y. ¬P(y), the free variables xγ and yδ do not depend on each other and there
is no reason to insist on xγ being older than yδ. Note that moving-in the existential quantifier
transforms the original formula into the logically equivalent formula ∃x. P(x) ∨ ∀y. ¬P(y),
which (after a preceding α-step) enables the δ-step introducing yδ to come before the γ-step
introducing xγ.
Keeping small the variable-conditions generated by the δ-rule results in non-elementary reduc-
tion of the size of smallest proofs. This “liberalization of the δ-rule” has a history ranging from
Smullyan (1968) over Ha¨hnle & Schmitt (1994) to Baaz & Fermu¨ller (1995). While the liberal-
ized δ-rule of Smullyan (1968) is already able to prove the formula of Example 1.2 with a single
γ-step, it is much more restrictive than the more liberalized δ-rule of Baaz & Fermu¨ller (1995).
7Note that liberalization of the δ-rule is not simple because it easily results in unsound calculi,
cf. Kohlhase (1995) w.r.t. our Example 1.3 and Kohlhase (1998) w.r.t. our Example 5.18. The
difficulty lies with instantiation steps that relate previously unrelated variables:
Example 1.3
∃x. ∀y. Q(x, y) ∨ ∃u. ∀v. ¬Q(v, u)
is not deductively valid (to wit, let Q be the identity relation on a non-trivial universe).
Consider the following proof attempt: One α-, two γ-, and two liberalized δ-steps result in
Q(xγ, yδ), ¬Q(vδ, uγ) (∗)
with variable-condition
R := {(xγ, yδ), (uγ, vδ)}. (#)
(Note that the non-liberalized δ-rule would additionally have produced (xγ, vδ) or (uγ, yδ) or both,
depending on the order of the proof steps.)
When we now instantiate xγ with vδ, we relate the previously unrelated variables uγ and yδ.
Thus, our new goal
Q(vδ, yδ), ¬Q(vδ, uγ)
must be equipped with the new variable-condition {(uγ, yδ)}. Otherwise we could instantiate uγ
with yδ, resulting in the tautology Q(vδ, yδ), ¬Q(vδ, yδ).
Note that in the standard framework of Skolemization and unification, this new variable-con-
dition is automatically generated by the occur-check of unification: When we instantiate xγ with
vδ(uγ) in
Q(xγ, yδ(xγ)), ¬Q(vδ(uγ), uγ)
we get
Q(vδ(uγ), yδ(vδ(uγ))), ¬Q(vδ(uγ), uγ),
which cannot be reduced to a tautology because yδ(vδ(uγ)) and uγ cannot be unified.
When we instantiate the variables xγ and uγ in the sequence (∗) in parallel via
σ := {xγ 7→vδ, uγ7→yδ}, ($)
we have to check whether the newly imposed variable-conditions are consistent with the substi-
tution itself. In particular, a cycle as given (for the R of (#)) by
yδ σ−1 uγ R vδ σ−1 xγ R yδ
must not exist. Although this sounds fairly difficult, the formal treatment is quite simple.
82 Basic Notions, Notations, and Assumptions
We make use of “[. . . ]” for stating two definitions, lemmas, or theorems (and their proofs &c.) in
one, where the parts between ‘[’ and ‘]’ are optional and are meant to be all included or all omitted.
‘N’ denotes the set of and ‘≺’ the ordering on natural numbers. We define N+ := { n∈N |
0 6=n }.
Let ‘R’ denote a binary relation. R is said to be a relation on A if dom(R)∪ ran(R) ⊆ A.
R is irreflexive if id ∩ R = ∅. It is A-reflexive if A¸id ⊆ R. Simply speaking of a reflexive
relation we refer to the biggest A that is appropriate in the local context, and referring to this A
we write R0 to ambiguously denote A¸id. Furthermore, we write R1 to denote R. For n ∈ N+
we write Rn+1 to denote Rn◦R, such that Rn denotes the n step relation for R. The transitive
closure of R is R+ :=
⋃
n∈N+
Rn. The reflexive & transitive closure of R is R∗ := ⋃n∈NRn.
The reverse5 of R will be denoted with R−1. R is terminating if there is no s : N→ dom(R)
with si R si+1 for all i ∈ N.
Furthermore, we use ‘∅’ to denote the empty set as well as the empty function or empty word.
By an (irreflexive) ordering ‘<’ (on A) we mean an irreflexive and transitive binary relation (on
A), sometimes called “strict partial ordering” &c. by other authors. A reflexive ordering ‘≤’ on
A is an A-reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive relation on A. The reflexive ordering on A of
an ordering < is (< ∪ id) ∩ (A×A). An ordering < is called wellfounded if > is terminating;
where, as with all our asymmetric relation symbols, > := <−1. The class of total functions
from A to B is denoted with A → B. The class of (possibly) partial functions from A to B is
denoted with A B.
Validity is expected to be given with respect to some Σ-structure (Σ-algebra) A, assigning a
universe (to each sort) and an appropriate function to each symbol in Σ. For X ⊆ Vfree we denote
the set of total A-valuations of X (i.e. functions mapping free variables to objects of the universe
of A (respecting sorts)) with X→ A and the set of (possibly) partial A-valuations of X with
X A. For π ∈ X→ A we denote with ‘A⊎π’ the extension of A to the variables of X which
are then treated as nullary constants. More precisely, we assume the existence of some evaluation
function ‘eval’ such that eval(A⊎π) maps any term over Σ⊎X into the universe of A (respecting
sorts) such that for all x ∈ X: eval(A⊎π)(x) =π(x). Moreover, eval(A⊎π) maps any formula
B over Σ⊎X to TRUE or FALSE, such that B is valid in A⊎π iff eval(A⊎π)(B) = TRUE. We
assume that the Substitution-Lemma holds in the sense that, for any substitution σ, Σ-structureA,
and valuation π ∈ Vfree → A, validity of a formula B inA⊎((σ ⊎ Vfree\dom(σ)¸id) ◦ eval(A⊎π)) is
logically equivalent to validity of Bσ in A⊎π. Finally, we assume that the value of the evaluation
function on a term or formula B does not depend on the free variables that do not occur in
B: eval(A⊎π)(B) = eval(A⊎ Vfree(B)¸π)(B). Further properties of validity or evaluation are
definitely not needed.
93 Two Versions of Variable-Conditions
In this section we formally describe two possible choices for the formal treatment of variable-con-
ditions. The weak version works well with the non-liberalized δ-rule. The strong version is a little
more difficult but can be used for the liberalized versions of the δ-rule. The presented material is
rather formal, but this cannot be avoided and the following sections will be less difficult then.
Several binary relations on free variables will be introduced. The overall idea is that when
(x, y) occurs in such a relation this means something like “x is older than y” or “the value of y
depends on or is described in terms of x”.
Definition 3.1 (Eσ, Uσ)
For a substitution σ with dom(σ)=Vγ we define the existential relation to be
Eσ := { (x
′, x) | x′ ∈Vγ(σ(x)) ∧ x∈Vγ }
and the universal relation to be
Uσ := { (y, x) | y ∈Vδ(σ(x)) ∧ x∈Vγ }.
Definition 3.2 ([Strong] Existential R-Substitution)
Let R be a variable-condition.
σ is an existential R-substitution if σ is a substitution with dom(σ)=Vγ for which Uσ ◦R is
irreflexive.
σ is a strong existential R-substitution if σ is a substitution with dom(σ)=Vγ for which
(Uσ ◦R)
+ is a wellfounded ordering.
Note that, regarding syntax, (xγ, yδ)∈R is intended to mean that an existential R-substitu-
tion σ may not replace xγ with a term in which yδ occurs, i.e. (yδ, xγ)∈Uσ must be disallowed,
i.e. Uσ◦R must be irreflexive. Thus, the definition of a (weak) existential R-substitution is
quite straightforward. The definition of a strong existential R-substitution requires an additional
transitive closure because the strong version then admits a smaller R. To see this, take from Ex-
ample 1.3 the variable-condition R of (#) and the σ of ($). As explained there, σ must not be a
strong existential R-substitution due to the cycle yδ Uσ uγ R vδ Uσ xγ R yδ which just contradicts
the irreflexivity of (Uσ◦R)2. Note that in practice w.l.o.g. Uσ and R can always be chosen to
be finite, so that irreflexivity of (Uσ◦R)+ is then equivalent to (Uσ◦R)+ being a wellfounded
ordering.
10
After application of a [strong] existential R-substitution σ, in case of (xγ, yδ)∈R, we have to
ensure that xγ is not replaced with yδ via a future application of another [strong] existential R-
substitution that replaces a free γ-variable uγ occurring in σ(xγ) with yδ. In this case, the new
variable-condition has to contain (uγ, yδ). This means that Eσ◦R must be a subset of the updated
variable-condition. For the weak version this is already enough. For the strong version we have
to add an arbitrary number of steps with Uσ◦R again.
Definition 3.3 ([Strong] σ-Update)
Let R be a variable-condition and σ be an [strong] existential R-substitution.
The [strong] σ-update of R is Eσ◦R [ ◦ (Uσ◦R)∗].
Example 3.4
In the proof attempt of Example 1.3 we applied the strong existential R-substitution
σ′ := {xγ 7→vδ} ⊎ Vγ\{xγ}¸id
where R= {(xγ, yδ), (uγ, vδ)}. Note that
Uσ′ = {(v
δ, xγ)}
and
Eσ′ = Vγ\{xγ}¸id.
Thus:
Eσ′◦R ◦ (Uσ′◦R)
0 = {(uγ, vδ)}
Eσ′◦R ◦ (Uσ′◦R)
1 = {(uγ, yδ)}
Eσ′◦R ◦ (Uσ′◦R)
2 = ∅
The strong σ′-update of R is then the new variable-condition
{(uγ, vδ), (uγ, yδ)}.
11
LetA be someΣ-structure. We now define a semantic counterpart of our existentialR-substitutions,
which we will call “existential (A, R)-valuation”. Suppose that e maps each free γ-variable not
directly to an object of A (of the same sort), but can additionally read the values of some free
δ-variables under an A-valuation π ∈ Vδ → A, i.e. e gets some π′ ∈ Vδ  A with π′⊆π as a
second argument; short: e : Vγ → ((Vδ  A)→ A). Moreover, for each free γ-variable x, we
require the set of read free δ-variables (i.e. dom(π′)) to be identical for all π; i.e. there has to be
some “semantic relation” Se ⊆ Vδ×Vγ such that for all x ∈ Vγ:
e(x) : (Se〈{x}〉 → A)→ A.
Note that, for each e, at most one semantic relation exists, namely
Se := { (y, x) | y∈ dom(
⋃
(dom(e(x)))) ∧ x∈Vγ }.
Definition 3.5 (Se, [Strong] Existential (A, R)-Valuation, ǫ)
Let R be a variable-condition, A a Σ-structure, and e : Vγ → ((Vδ  A)→ A).
The semantic relation of e is Se := { (y, x) | y∈ dom(
⋃
(dom(e(x)))) ∧ x∈Vγ }.
e is an existential (A, R)-valuation if Se ◦R is irreflexive and, for all x ∈ Vγ,
e(x) : (Se〈{x}〉 → A)→ A.
e is a strong existential (A, R)-valuation if (Se ◦R)+ is a wellfounded ordering and, for all
x ∈ Vγ,
e(x) : (Se〈{x}〉 → A)→ A.
Finally, for applying [strong] existential (A, R)-valuations in a uniform manner, we define the
function
ǫ : (Vγ → ((Vδ  A)→ A)) → ((Vδ → A)→ (Vγ → A))
by ( e ∈ Vγ → ((Vδ  A)→ A), π ∈ Vδ → A, x ∈ Vγ )
ǫ(e)(π)(x) := e(x)(Se〈{x}〉¸π).
Lemma 3.6 Let R be a variable-condition.
1. Let R′ be a variable-condition with R⊆R′.
For each [strong] existential (A, R′)-valuation e′ there is some
[strong] existential (A, R)-valuation e such that ǫ(e) = ǫ(e′).
2. Let σ be a [strong] existential R-substitution and R′ the [strong] σ-update of R.
For each [strong] existential (A, R′)-valuation e′ there is some
[strong] existential (A, R)-valuation e such that for all π ∈ Vδ → A:
ǫ(e)(π) = σ ◦ eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e′)(π) ⊎ π).
12
4 The Weak Version
We are now going to define R-validity of a set of sequents with free variables, in terms of validity
of a formula (where the free variables are treated as nullary constants).
Definition 4.1 (Validity)
Let R be a variable-condition, A a Σ-structure, and G a set of sequents.
G is R-valid in A if there is an existential (A, R)-valuation e such that G is (e,A)-valid.
G is (e,A)-valid if G is (π, e,A)-valid for all π ∈ Vδ → A.
G is (π, e,A)-valid if G is valid in A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π.
G is valid in A if Γ is valid in A for all Γ ∈ G.
A sequent Γ is valid in A if there is some formula listed in Γ that is valid in A.
Validity in a class of Σ-structures is understood as validity in each of the Σ-structures of that
class.
If we omit the reference to a special Σ-structure we mean validity (or reduction, cf. below) in
some fixed class K of Σ-structures, e.g. the class of all Σ-structures (Σ-algebras) or the class of
Herbrand Σ-structures (term-generated Σ-algebras), cf. Wirth& Gramlich (1994) for more inter-
esting classes for establishing inductive validities.
Lemma 4.2 (Anti-Monotonicity of Validity in R)
Let G be a set of sequents and R and R′ variable-conditions with R⊆R′. Now:
If G is R′-valid in A, then G is R-valid in A.
Example 4.3 (Validity)
For xγ ∈ Vγ, yδ ∈ Vδ, the sequent xγ=yδ is ∅-valid in any A because we can choose Se := Vδ×Vγ
and e(xγ)(π) := π(yδ) resulting in ǫ(e)(π)(xγ) = e(xγ)(Se〈{xγ}〉¸π) = e(xγ)(Vδ¸π) = π(yδ). This
means that ∅-validity of xγ=yδ is the same as validity of ∀y. ∃x. x=y. Moreover, note that
ǫ(e)(π) has access to the π-value of yδ just as a raising function f for x in the raised (i.e. dually
Skolemized) version f(yδ)=yδ of ∀y. ∃x. x=y.
Contrary to this, for R := Vγ×Vδ, the same formula xγ=yδ is not R-valid in general because
then the required irreflexivity of Se◦R implies Se= ∅, and e(xγ)(Se〈{xγ}〉¸π) = e(xγ)(∅¸π) =
e(xγ)(∅) cannot depend on π(yδ) anymore. This means that (Vγ×Vδ)-validity of xγ=yδ is the
same as validity of ∃x. ∀y. x=y. Moreover, note that ǫ(e)(π) has no access to the π-value of yδ
just as a raising function c for x in the raised version c=yδ of ∃x. ∀y. x=y.
For a more general example let G = { Ai,0 . . . Ai,ni−1 | i∈ I }, where for i ∈ I and j≺ni the
Ai,j are formulas with free γ-variables from ~x and free δ-variables from ~y. Then (Vγ×Vδ)-validity
of G means validity of ∃~x. ∀~y. ∀i∈ I. ∃j≺ni. Ai,j ; whereas ∅-validity of G means validity of
∀~y. ∃~x. ∀i∈ I. ∃j≺ni. Ai,j.
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Besides the notion of validity we need the notion of reduction. Roughly speaking, a set G0 of
sequents reduces to a set G1 of sequents if validity of G1 implies validity of G0. This, however, is
too weak for our purposes here because we are not only interested in validity but also in preserving
the solutions for the free γ-variables: For inductive theorem proving, answer computation, and
constraint solving it becomes important that the solutions of G1 are also solutions of G0.
Definition 4.4 (Reduction)
G0 R-reduces to G1 in A if for all existential (A, R)-valuations e:
if G1 is (e,A)-valid then G0 is (e,A)-valid, too.
Lemma 4.5 (Reduction)
Let R, R′ be variable-conditions;A a Σ-structure; G0, G1, G2, and G3 sets of sequents. Now:
1. (Validity)
If G0 R-reduces to G1 in A and G1 is R-valid in A,
then G0 is R-valid in A, too.
2. (Reflexivity)
In case of G0⊆G1: G0 R-reduces to G1 in A.
3. (Transitivity)
If G0 R-reduces to G1 in A and G1 R-reduces to G2 in A,
then G0 R-reduces to G2 in A.
4. (Additivity)
If G0 R-reduces to G2 in A and G1 R-reduces to G3 in A,
then G0∪G1 R-reduces to G2∪G3 in A.
5. (Monotonicity in R)
In case of R⊆R′: If G0 R-reduces to G1 in A, then G0 R′-reduces to G1 in A.
6. (Instantiation)
For an existential R-substitution σ, and R′ the σ-update of R:
(a) If G0σ is R′-valid in A, then G0 is R-valid in A.
(b) If G0 R-reduces to G1 in A, then G0σ R′-reduces to G1σ in A.
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Now we are going to abstractly describe deductive sequent and tableau calculi. We will later
show that the usual deductive first-order calculi are instances of our abstract calculi. The benefit
of the abstract version is that every instance is automatically sound. Due to the small number of
inference rules in deductive first-order calculi and the locality of soundness, this abstract version
is not really necessary. For inductive calculi, however, due to a bigger number of inference rules
(which usually have to be improved now and then) and the globality of soundness, such an abstract
version is very helpful, cf. Wirth & Becker (1995), Wirth (1997).
Definition 4.6 (Proof Forest)
A (deductive) proof forest in a sequent (or else: tableau) calculus is a pair (F,R) where R is a
variable-condition and F is a set of pairs (Γ, t), where Γ is a sequent and t is a tree6 whose nodes
are labeled with sequents (or else: formulas).
Note that the tree t is intended to represent a proof attempt for Γ . The nodes of t are labeled with
formulas in case of a tableau calculus and with sequents in case of a sequent calculus. While the
sequents at the nodes of a tree in a sequent calculus stand for themselves, in a tableau calculus all
the ancestors have to be included to make up a sequent and, moreover, the formulas at the labels
are in negated form:
Definition 4.7 (Goals(), AX , Closedness)
‘Goals(T )’ denotes the set of sequents labeling the leaves of the trees in the set T (or else: the set
of sequents resulting from listing the conjugates of the formulas labeling a branch from a leaf to
the root in a tree in T ).
In what follows, we assume AX to be some set of axioms. By this we mean that AX is Vγ×Vδ-
valid. (Cf. the last sentence in Definition 4.1.)
The tree t is closed if Goals({t}) ⊆ AX .
The readers may ask themselves why we consider a proof forest instead of a single proof tree
only. The possibility to have an empty proof forest provides a nicer starting point. Besides that,
if we have trees (Γ, t), (Γ ′, t′) ∈ F we can apply Γ as a lemma in the tree t′ of Γ ′, provided
that the lemma application relation is acyclic. For deductive theorem proving the availability of
lemma application is not really necessary. For inductive theorem proving, however, lemma and
induction hypothesis application of this form becomes necessary.
Definition 4.8 (Invariant Condition)
The invariant condition on (F,R) is that {Γ} R-reduces to Goals({t}) for all (Γ, t) ∈ F .
Theorem 4.9
Let the proof forest (F,R) satisfy the above invariant condition. Let (Γ, t)∈F.
If t is closed, then Γ is R-valid.
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Theorem 4.10
The above invariant condition is always satisfied when we start with an empty proof forest
(F,R) := (∅, ∅) and then iterate only the following kinds of modifications of (F,R) (resulting in
(F ′, R′)):
Hypothesizing: Let R′ be a variable-condition with R⊆R′. Let Γ be a sequent. Let t be the
tree with a single node only, which is labeled with Γ (or else: with a single branch only,
such that Γ is the list of the conjugates of the formulas labeling the branch from the leaf to
the root). Then we may set F ′ := F ∪ {(Γ, t)}.
Expansion: Let (Γ, t) ∈ F . Let R′ be a variable-condition with R⊆R′. Let l be a leaf in t. Let
∆ be the label of l (or else: result from listing the conjugates of the formulas labeling the
branch from l to the root of t). Let G be a finite set of sequents. Now if {∆} R′-reduces
to G (or else: { Λ∆ | Λ∈G }), then we may set F ′ := (F\{(Γ, t)}) ∪ {(Γ, t′)} where t′
results from t by adding to the former leaf l, exactly for each sequent Λ in G, a new child
node labeled with Λ (or else: a new child branch such that Λ is the list of the conjugates of
the formulas labeling the branch from the leaf to the new child node of l).
Instantiation: Let σ be an existential R-substitution. Let R′ be the σ-update of R. Then we may
set F ′ := Fσ.
While Hypothesizing and Instantiation steps are self-explanatory, Expansion steps are parameter-
ized by a sequent ∆ and a set of sequents G such that {∆} R′-reduces to G. For tableau calculi,
however, this set of sequents must actually have the form { Λ∆ | Λ∈G } because an Expansion
step cannot remove formulas from ancestor nodes. This is because these formulas are also part of
the goals associated with other leaves in the proof tree. Therefore, although tableau calculi may
save repetition of formulas, sequent calculi have substantial advantages: Rewriting of formulas in
place is always possible, and we can remove formulas that are redundant w.r.t. the other formulas
in a sequent. But this is not our subject here. For the below examples of α-, β-, γ-, and δ-rules
we will use the sequent calculi presentation because it is a little more explicit. When we write
∆
Π0 . . . Πn−1
R′′
we want to denote a sub-rule of the Expansion rule which is given by G := {Π0, . . . , Πn−1}
and R′ := R ∪ R′′. This means that for this rule really being a sub-rule of the Expansion rule
we have to show that {∆} R′-reduces to G. By Lemma 4.5(5) and because R does not matter
here, it suffices that we actually show that {∆}R′′-reduces to G. Moreover, note that in old times
when trees grew upwards, Gerhard Gentzen would have written Π0 . . . Πn−1 above the line
and ∆ below, such that passing the line meant implication. In our case, passing the line means
reduction.
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Let A and B be formulas, Γ and Π sequents, x ∈ Vbound, xγ ∈ Vγ \ Vγ(A, ΓΠ), 7 and xδ ∈ Vδ \
Vδ(A, ΓΠ).
α-rules:
Γ (A∨B) Π
A B Γ Π
∅
Γ ¬(A∧B) Π
A B Γ Π
∅
Γ ¬¬A Π
A Γ Π
∅
β-rules:
Γ (A∧B) Π
A Γ Π B Γ Π
∅
Γ ¬(A∨B) Π
A Γ Π B Γ Π
∅
γ-rules:
Γ ∃x:A Π
A{x7→xγ} Γ ∃x:A Π
∅
Γ ¬∀x:A Π
A{x7→xγ} Γ ¬∀x:A Π
∅
δ-rules:
Γ ∀x:A Π
A{x7→xδ} Γ Π
Vγ(A, ΓΠ)× {x
δ}
Γ ¬∃x:A Π
A{x7→xδ} Γ Π
Vγ(A, ΓΠ)× {x
δ}
Theorem 4.11
The above examples of α-, β-, γ-, and δ-rules are all sub-rules of the Expansion rule of the
sequent calculus of Theorem 4.10.
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5 The Strong Version
The additional solutions (or existential substitutions) of the strong version (which admit additional
proofs compared to the weak version) do not add much difficulty when one is interested in validity
only, cf. e.g. Ha¨hnle & Schmitt (1994). When also the preservation of solutions is required,
however, the additional substitutions pose some problems because the new solutions may tear
some free δ-variables out of their contexts:
Example 5.1 (Reduction & Liberalized δ-Steps)
In Example 1.2 a liberalized δ-step reduced
P(xγ), ∀y. ¬P(y)
to
P(xγ), ¬P(yδ)
with empty variable-condition R := ∅.
The latter sequent is (e,A)-valid for the strong existential (A, R)-valuation e given by
e(xγ)(π) := π(yδ).
The former sequent, however, is not (e,A)-valid when PA(a) is true and PA(b) is false for some
a, b from the universe of A. To see this, take some π with π(yδ) := b.
How can we solve the problem exhibited in Example 5.1? I.e. how can we change the notion of
reduction such that the liberalized δ-step becomes a reduction step?
1. The approach we tried first was to allow a slight modification of e to e′ such that
e′(xγ)(π) = a. This trial finally failed because it was not possible to preserve reduction
under Instantiation-steps.
E.g., an Instantiation-step with the strong existential R-substitution {xγ 7→yδ} transforms
the reduction of Example 5.1 into the reduction of
P(yδ), ∀y. ¬P(y)
to
P(yδ), ¬P(yδ).
Taking π, e, and A as in Example 5.1, the new latter sequent is still (e,A)-valid. There is,
however, no modification e′ of e such that the new former sequent is (π, e′,A)-valid.
Thus, with this approach, reduction could not be preserved by Instantiation-steps.
Moreover, the modification of e does not go together well with our requirement of preser-
vation of solutions.
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2. Learning from this, the second approach we tried was to allow a slight modification of π
instead. E.g., for the reduction step of Example 5.1, we would require the existence of
some η ∈ {yδ} → A such that the former sequent is (Vδ\{yδ}¸π⊎η, e,A)-valid instead of
(π, e,A)-valid. Choosing η := {yδ7→a} would solve the problem of Example 5.1 then:
Indeed, the former sequent is (Vδ\{yδ}¸π⊎η, e,A)-valid because for the e of Example 5.1
we have e(xγ)(Vδ\{yδ}¸π⊎η) = (Vδ\{yδ}¸π⊎η)(yδ) = a.
Moreover, with this approach, reduction is preserved under Instantiation-steps.
The problems with this approach arise, however, when one asks whether there has to be a
single η for all π or, for each π, a different η.
If we require a single η, we cannot model liberalized δ-steps where another free δ-variable,
say zδ, occurs in the principal formula, as, e.g., in the reduction of
zδ=xγ, ∀y. zδ6=y
to
zδ=xγ, zδ6=yδ
with empty variable-condition. In this case, for the e of Example 5.1 (which gives xγ
the value of yδ) the η ∈ {yδ} → A must change when the π-value of zδ changes: E.g.,
for π := {yδ7→a, zδ7→b} we need η(yδ) := b, while for π := {yδ7→b, zδ7→a} we need
η(yδ) := a. Indeed, in the reduction above, yδ is functionally dependent on zδ.
If, on the other hand, we admit a different η for each π, the transitivity of reduction (cf.
Lemma 4.5(3)) gets lost.
Thus, the only solution can be that η depends on some values of π and not on others. Since
the abstract treatment of this gets very ugly and does not extract much information on the
solution of free γ-variables of the original theorem from a completed proof, we prefer to
remember what role the free δ-variables introduced by liberalized δ-steps really play. And
this is what the following definition is about.
Definition 5.2 (Choice-Condition, Extension)
C is a (R,<)-choice-condition if C is a (possibly) partial function from Vδ into the set of
formulas, R is a variable-condition, < is a wellfounded ordering on Vδ with (R ◦<) ⊆ R, and,
for all yδ ∈ dom(C):
zδ < yδ for all zδ ∈ Vδ(C(yδ))\{yδ}
and
uγ R yδ for all uγ ∈ Vγ(C(yδ)).
(C ′, R′, <′) is an extension of (C,R,<) if C⊆C ′, R⊆R′, and C ′ is a (R′, <′)-choice-
condition.
Note that ∅ is a (R, ∅)-choice-condition for any variable-condition R. For the meaning of choice-
conditions cf. Definition 5.6.
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Definition 5.3 (Extended Strong σ-Update)
Let C be a (R,<)-choice-condition and σ a strong existential R-substitution.
The extended strong σ-update (C ′, R′, <′) of (C,R,<) is given by
C ′ := { (x,Bσ) | (x,B)∈C },
R′ is the strong σ-update of R,
<′ := < ◦ (Uσ◦R)
∗ ∪ (Uσ◦R)
+.
Lemma 5.4 (Theorem 62 in Doornbos &al. (1997))
If A and B are two terminating relations with A◦B ⊆ A ∪ B◦(A ∪ B)∗,
then A ∪ B is terminating, too.
Lemma 5.5 (Extended Strong σ-Update)
Let C be a (R,<)-choice-condition, σ a strong existential R-substitution, and (C ′, R′, <′) the
extended strong σ-update of (C,R,<). Now: C ′ is a (R′, <′)-choice-condition.
Definition 5.6 (Compatibility)
Let C be a (R,<)-choice-condition, A a Σ-structure, and e a strong existential (A, R)-valuation.
We say that π is (e,A)-compatible with C if π ∈Vδ → A and for each yδ ∈ dom(C):
If C(yδ) is (π, e,A)-valid,
then C(yδ) is (Vδ\{yδ}¸π ⊎ η, e,A)-valid for all η ∈ {yδ} → A.
Note that (e,A)-compatibility of π with {(yδ, B)} means that a different choice for the π-value
of yδ does not destroy the validity of the formula B in A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π, or that π(yδ) is chosen
such that B becomes invalid if such a choice is possible, which is closely related to Hilbert’s
ε-operator ( yδ = εy. (¬B{yδ7→y}) ).
We are now going to proceed like in the previous section, but using the strong versions instead of
the weak ones.
Definition 5.7 (Strong Validity)
Let C be a (R,<)-choice-condition, A a Σ-structure, and G a set of sequents.
G is C-strongly R-valid in A if there is a strong existential (A, R)-valuation e such that G is
C-strongly (e,A)-valid.
G is C-strongly (e,A)-valid if G is (π, e,A)-valid for each π that is (e,A)-compatible with C.
The rest is given by Definition 4.1.
Lemma 5.8 (Anti-Monotonicity in R and Monotonicity in C)
Let G be a set of sequents, C a (R,<)-choice-condition, and C ′ a (R′, <′)-choice-condition with
R⊆R′ and C ′⊆C. Now:
If G is C ′-strongly R′-valid in A, then G is C-strongly R-valid in A.
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Example 5.9 (Strong Validity)
Note that ∅-validity does not differ from ∅-strong ∅-validity and that Vγ×Vδ-validity does not
differ from ∅-strong Vγ×Vδ-validity. This is because the notions of weak and strong existential
valuations do not differ in these cases. Therefore, Example 4.3 is also an example for strong
validity.
Although ∅-strong R-validity always implies (weak) R-validity (because each strong existen-
tial (A, R)-valuation is a (weak) existential (A, R)-valuation), for R not being one of the ex-
tremes ∅ and Vγ×Vδ, (weak) R-validity and ∅-strong R-validity differ from each other. E.g. the
sequent (∗) in Example 1.3 is (weakly) R-valid but not ∅-strongly R-valid for the R of (#):
For Se := {(yδ, uγ), (vδ, xγ)} we get Se◦R = {(yδ, vδ), (vδ, yδ)}, which is irreflexive.
Since the sequent (∗) is (e,A)-valid for the (weak) existential (A, R)-valuation e given by
e(xγ)(Se〈{xγ}〉¸π) = π(v
δ) and e(uγ)(Se〈{uγ}〉¸π) = π(yδ), the sequent (∗) is (weakly) R-valid
in A. But (Se◦R)2 is not irreflexive, so that this e is no strong existential (A, R)-valuation,
which means that the sequent (∗) cannot be ∅-strongly R-valid in general.
For nonempty C, however, we must admit that C-strong R-validity is hard to understand.
We have to make sure that C-strong R-validity can be easily understood in terms of ∅-strong
R′-validity for some R′, which again implies (weak) R′-validity and ∅-validity. Note that this
difficulty did not arise in the weak version because Lemma 4.2 states anti-monotonicity of (weak)
R-validity in R, whereas Lemma 5.8 states anti-monotonicity of C-strong R-validity in R but
only monotonicity of C-strong R-validity in C.
Lemma 5.10 (Compatibility and Validity)
Let A be a Σ-structure, C a (R,<)-choice-condition, and e a strong existential (A, R)-
valuation.
Define ⊳ := (Se ∪R ∪<)+.
1. ⊳ is a wellfounded ordering on Vfree.
2. There is a function ξ : ( (Vδ\dom(C))→ A )→ ( dom(C)→ A ) such that,
for all π, π′ ∈ (Vδ\dom(C))→ A, π ⊎ ξpi is (e,A)-compatible with C, and,
for x ∈ dom(C), ⊳〈{x}〉¸π = ⊳〈{x}〉¸π′ implies ξpi(x) = ξpi′(x).
3. Let G be a set of sequents and ς ∈ (Vδ(G) ∩ dom(C))→ (Vγ\Vγ(G)) be injective.
(a) If G is C-strongly (e,A)-valid, then Gς is ∅-strongly R′-valid in A
for R′ := Vγ\ran(ς)¸R ∪
⋃
y∈ran(ς)
{y} × 〈{ς−1(y)}〉E ∪ Vγ× dom(C),
where E is the reflexive ordering on Vδ of ⊳.
(b) If G is C-strongly R-valid in A, then Gς is ∅-strongly Vγ\ran(ς)¸R-valid in A and even
∅-strongly R′′-valid in A
for R′′ := Vγ\ran(ς)¸R ∪
⋃
y∈ran(ς)
{y} × 〈{ς−1(y)}〉< ∪ Vγ× dom(C).
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Definition 5.11 (Strong Reduction)
Let C be a (R,<)-choice-condition, A a Σ-structure, and G0, G1 sets of sequents.
G0 strongly (R,C)-reduces to G1 in A if for each strong existential (A, R)-valuation e and each
π that is (e,A)-compatible with C:
if G1 is (π, e,A)-valid, then G0 is (π, e,A)-valid.
Lemma 5.12 (Strong Reduction)
Let C be a (R,<)-choice-condition;A a Σ-structure; G0, G1, G2, and G3 sets of sequents. Now:
1. (Validity)
Assume that G0 strongly (R,C)-reduces to G1 in A. Now:
If G1 is C-strongly (e,A)-valid for some strong existential (A, R)-valuation e,
then G0 is C-strongly (e,A)-valid.
If G1 is C-strongly R-valid in A, then G0 is C-strongly R-valid in A.
2. (Reflexivity)
In case of G0⊆G1: G0 strongly (R,C)-reduces to G1 in A.
3. (Transitivity)
If G0 strongly (R,C)-reduces to G1 in A and G1 strongly (R,C)-reduces to G2 in A,
then G0 strongly (R,C)-reduces to G2 in A.
4. (Additivity)
If G0 strongly (R,C)-reduces to G2 in A and G1 strongly (R,C)-reduces to G3 in A,
then G0∪G1 strongly (R,C)-reduces to G2∪G3 in A.
5. (Monotonicity)
For (C ′, R′, <′) being an extension of (C,R,<):
If G0 strongly (R,C)-reduces to G1 in A, then G0 strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to G1 in A.
6. (Instantiation)
For a strong existential R-substitution σ, and the extended strong σ-update (C ′, R′, <′)
of (C,R,<):
(a) If G0σ is C ′-strongly R′-valid in A, then G0 is C-strongly R-valid in A.
(b) If G0 strongly (R,C)-reduces to G1 in A,
then G0σ strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to G1σ in A.
22
Now we are going to abstractly describe deductive sequent and tableau calculi. We will later
show that the usual deductive first-order calculi are instances of our abstract calculi.
Definition 5.13 (Strong Proof Forest)
A strong (deductive) proof forest in a sequent (or else: tableau) calculus is a quadruple (F,C,R,<
) where C is a (R,<)-choice-condition and F is a set of pairs (Γ, t), where Γ is a sequent and t
is a tree whose nodes are labeled with sequents (or else: formulas).
The notions of Goals(), AX , and closedness of Definition 4.7 are not changed. Note, however,
that the Vγ×Vδ-validity of AX immediately implies the ∅-strong Vγ×Vδ-validity of AX , which
(by Lemma 5.8) is the logically strongest kind of C-strong R-validity.
Definition 5.14 (Strong Invariant Condition)
The strong invariant condition on (F,C,R,<) is that {Γ} strongly (R,C)-reduces to Goals({t})
for all (Γ, t) ∈ F .
Theorem 5.15
Let the strong proof forest (F,C,R,<) satisfy the above strong invariant condition. Let (Γ, t)∈F
and t be closed. Now:
Γ is C-strongly R-valid and, for any injective ς ∈ (Vδ(Γ ) ∩ dom(C))→ (Vγ\Vγ(Γ )),
Γς is ∅-strongly Vγ\ran(ς)¸R-valid and even ∅-strongly R′-valid for
R′ := Vγ\ran(ς)¸R ∪
⋃
y∈ran(ς)
{y} × 〈{ς−1(y)}〉< ∪ Vγ× dom(C).
Theorem 5.16
The above strong invariant condition is always satisfied when we start with an empty strong proof
forest (F,C,R,<) := (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) and then iterate only the following kinds of modifications of
(F,C,R,<) (resulting in (F ′, C ′, R′, <′)):
Hypothesizing: Let R′ := R∪R′′ be a variable-condition with (R′′◦<) ⊆ R′. Set C ′ := C and
<′ := <. Let Γ be a sequent. Let t be the tree with a single node only, which is labeled with
Γ (or else: with a single branch only, such that Γ is the list of the conjugates of the formulas
labeling the branch from the leaf to the root). Then we may set F ′ := F ∪ {(Γ, t)}.
Expansion: Let (C ′, R′, <′) be an extension of (C,R,<). Let (Γ, t) ∈ F . Let l be a leaf in t.
Let ∆ be the label of l (or else: result from listing the conjugates of the formulas labeling
the branch from l to the root of t). Let G be a finite set of sequents. Now if {∆} strongly
(R′, C ′)-reduces to G (or else: { Λ∆ | Λ∈G }), then we may set F ′ := (F\{(Γ, t)}) ∪
{(Γ, t′)} where t′ results from t by adding to the former leaf l, exactly for each sequent Λ
in G, a new child node labeled with Λ (or else: a new child branch such that Λ is the list of
the conjugates of the formulas labeling the branch from the leaf to the new child node of l).
Instantiation: Let σ be a strong existential R-substitution. Let (C ′, R′, <′) be the extended
strong σ-update of (C,R,<). Then we may set F ′ := Fσ.
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While Hypothesizing and Instantiation steps are self-explanatory, Expansion steps are parame-
terized by a sequent ∆ and a set of sequents G such that {∆} strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to G for
some extension (C ′, R′, <′) of (C,R,<). For the below examples of α-, β-, γ-, and δ-rules we
will use the sequent calculi presentation because it is a little more explicit. When we write
∆
Π0 . . . Πn−1
C ′′
R′′
<′′
we want to denote a sub-rule of the Expansion rule which is given by G := {Π0, . . . , Πn−1},
C ′ := C ∪ C ′′, R′ := R ∪ R′′, and <′ := < ∪ <′′. This means that for this rule really being
a sub-rule of the Expansion rule we have to show that C ′ is a (R′, <′)-choice-condition and that
{∆} strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to G.
Let A and B be formulas, Γ and Π sequents, x ∈ Vbound, xγ ∈ Vγ \ Vγ(A, ΓΠ), 8 and xδ ∈ Vδ \(
Vδ(A, ΓΠ) ∪ dom(<) ∪ dom(C)
)
.
α-rules:
Γ (A∨B) Π
A B Γ Π
∅
∅
∅
Γ ¬(A∧B) Π
A B Γ Π
∅
∅
∅
Γ ¬¬A Π
A Γ Π
∅
∅
∅
β-rules:
Γ (A∧B) Π
A Γ Π B Γ Π
∅
∅
∅
Γ ¬(A∨B) Π
A Γ Π B Γ Π
∅
∅
∅
γ-rules:
Γ ∃x:A Π
A{x7→xγ} Γ ∃x:A Π
∅
∅
∅
Γ ¬∀x:A Π
A{x7→xγ} Γ ¬∀x:A Π
∅
∅
∅
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Liberalized δ-rules:
Γ ∀x:A Π
A{x7→xδ} Γ Π
{(xδ, A{x7→xδ})}
(Vγ(A) ∪ R〈Vδ(A)〉)× {x
δ}
≤〈Vδ(A)〉 × {x
δ}
Γ ¬∃x:A Π
A{x7→xδ} Γ Π
{(xδ, A{x7→xδ} )}
(Vγ(A) ∪ R〈Vδ(A)〉)× {x
δ}
≤〈Vδ(A)〉 × {x
δ}
Theorem 5.17
The above examples of α-, β-, γ-, and liberalized δ-rules are all sub-rules of the Expansion rule
of the sequent calculus of Theorem 5.16.
The following example shows thatR′′ of the above liberalized δ-rule must indeed contain R〈Vδ(A)〉×
{xδ}.
Example 5.18
∃y. ∀x.
(
¬Q(x, y) ∨ ∀z. Q(x, z)
)
is not deductively valid (to wit, let Q be the identity relation on a non-trivial universe).
γ-step:
∀x.
(
¬Q(x, yγ) ∨ ∀z. Q(x, z)
)
Liberalized δ-step: (
¬Q(xδ, yγ) ∨ ∀z. Q(xδ, z)
)
with choice-condition (xδ, (¬Q(xδ, yγ) ∨ ∀z. Q(xδ, z))) and variable-condition (yγ, xδ).
α-step:
¬Q(xδ, yγ), ∀z. Q(xδ, z)
Liberalized δ-step:
¬Q(xδ, yγ), Q(xδ, zδ)
with additional choice-condition (zδ,Q(xδ, zδ)) and additional variable-condition (yγ, zδ).
Note that the additional variable-condition arises although yγ does not appear in Q(xδ, z).
The reason for the additional variable-condition is yγ R xδ ∈ Vδ(Q(xδ, z)).
The variable-condition (yγ, zδ) is, however, essential for soundness, because without it we
could complete the proof attempt by application of the strong existential {(yγ, xδ)}-substitution
σ := {yγ7→zδ} ⊎ Vγ\{yγ}¸id.
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Another interesting point is that now that we have achieved our goal of liberalizing our δ-rule and
strictly increasing our proving possibilities, we must not use our original non-liberalized δ-rule of
§ 4 anymore. This sounds quite strange on the first view, but is simply due to our changed notion
of reduction. More precisely,
Weak δ-rule:
Γ ∀x:A Π
A{x7→xδ} Γ Π
∅
(Vγ(A, ΓΠ) ∪ R〈Vδ(A, ΓΠ)〉)× {x
δ}
≤〈Vδ(A, ΓΠ)〉 × {x
δ}
does not describe a sub-rule of the Expansion rule of the sequent calculus of Theorem 5.16. To
see this, let us start with the empty proof tree (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) and then hypothesize ∀x. x=0, which
we abbreviate with Γ . Applying the above weak δ-rule we get xδ=0 as the label of the only
leaf in the tree t of the proof tree ((Γ, t), ∅, ∅, ∅). But, while {Γ} does ∅-reduce to {xδ=0}
(i.e. Goals({t})), {Γ} does not strongly (∅, ∅)-reduce to {xδ=0}. To see this, consider some
Σ-structure A with non-trivial universe, an arbitrary strong existential (A, ∅)-valuation e, and
some π ∈ Vδ → A with π(xδ)= 0A. Then {xδ=0} is (π, e,A)-valid, but {Γ} is not. If we
had applied the liberalized δ-rule instead, we would have produced the proof tree ((Γ, t), C, ∅, ∅)
with C = {(xδ, xδ=0)}. And, indeed, π is not (e,A)-compatible with C, and {Γ} does strongly
(∅, C)-reduce to {xδ=0}.
Note that there is a fundamental difference related to the occurrence of the universal quantifi-
cation on π between the notion of (weak) reduction
. . .
(
∀π ∈ (Vδ → A). G1 (π, e,A)-valid
)
⇒
(
∀π ∈ (Vδ → A). G0 (π, e,A)-valid
)
. . .
and the notion of strong reduction
. . .∀π ∈ (Vδ → A) . . . .
(
G1 (π, e,A)-valid ⇒ G0 (π, e,A)-valid
)
. . . .
This difference in the nature of reduction renders the weak version applicable in areas where the
strong version is not. For this reason (and for the sake of stepwise presentation) we have included
the weak version in this paper although the strong version will turn out to be superior in all aspects
of the calculus of Theorem 5.17 treated in this paper.
This fundamental difference in the nature of reduction cannot be removed: Suppose to weaken
the notion of strong reduction in the following definition: G0 quite-strongly (R,C)-reduces to G1
inA if for each strong existential (A, R)-valuation e: if G1 is C-strongly (e,A)-valid, then G0 is
C-strongly (e,A)-valid. At first glance, this version seems to be very nice. One nice aspect is that
quite-strong (R, ∅)-reduction is so similar to (weak) R-reduction that we could omit the weak ver-
sion because it would be very unlikely to find an application of the weak version where the strong
version would not be applicable. Another nice aspect is that with quite-strong reduction we could
easily adapt our intended version of inductive theorem proving as described in § 1.1, which is not
so easy with strong reduction because the induction hypotheses application becomes difficult. But
for the (really essential!) monotonicity of reduction as given in Lemma 5.12(5), quite-strong re-
duction produces the following two additional requirements: dom(C ′\C)∩Vδ(G1 ∪ ran(C)) = ∅
and Vγ(G1) × dom(C ′\C) ⊆ R′. While the first requirement is unproblematic, the second one
restricts the δ-rule even more, which is the opposite of our intention behind the strong version,
namely to liberalize the δ-rule.
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Moreover, note that (as far as Theorem 5.17 is concerned) the choice-conditions do not have any
influence on our proofs and may be discarded. We could, however, use them for the following
purposes:
1. We could use the choice-conditions in order to weaken our requirements for our set of
axiomsAX : Instead of ∅-strong Vγ×Vδ-validity ofAX the weaker C-strong Vγ×Vδ-validity
of AX is sufficient for Theorem 5.15.
2. If we add a functional behavior to a choice-condition C, i.e. if we require that for (xδ, A) ∈
C the value for xδ is not just an arbitrary one from the set of values that make A invalid,
but a unique element of this set given by some choice-function, then we can use the choice-
conditions for simulating the behavior of the δ++-rule of Beckert &al. (1993) by using the
same free δ-variable for the same C-value and by later equating free δ-variables whose
C-values become equal during the proof.
3. Moreover, the choice-conditions may be used to get more interesting answers:
Example 5.19
Starting with the empty proof tree and hypothesizing
∀x. Q(x, x), ∃y.
(
¬Q(y, y) ∧ ¬P(y)
)
, P(zγ)
with the above rules we can produce a proof tree with the leaves
¬Q(yγ, yγ), Q(xδ, xδ), ∃y.
(
¬Q(y, y) ∧ ¬P(y)
)
, P(zγ)
and
¬P(yγ), Q(xδ, xδ), ∃y.
(
¬Q(y, y) ∧ ¬P(y)
)
, P(zγ)
and the (∅, ∅)-choice-condition {(xδ,Q(xδ, xδ))}.
The strong existential ∅-substitution {yγ7→xδ, zγ 7→xδ} ⊎ Vγ\{yγ,zγ}¸id closes the proof
tree via an Instantiation step. The answer xδ for our query variable zγ is not very interesting
unless we note that the choice-condition tells us to choose xδ in such a way that Q(xδ, xδ)
becomes false.
The rules of our weak version of § 4 are not only unable to provide any information on free
δ-variables, but also unable to prove the hypothesized sequent, because they can only show
∀x. Q(x, x), ∃y.
(
¬Q(y, y) ∧ ¬P(y)
)
, ∃z. P(z)
instead.
Thus it is obvious that the calculus of Theorem 5.17 is not only superior to the calculus of
Theorem 4.11 w.r.t. proving but also w.r.t. answer “computation”.
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Finally, note that (concerning the calculus of Theorem 5.17) the ordering < is not needed at all
when in the liberalized δ-steps we always choose a completely new free δ-variable xδ that does
not occur elsewhere and when in the Hypothesizing steps we guarantee that ran(R′′) contains
only new free δ-variables that have not occurred before. The former is reasonable anyhow, be-
cause the free δ-variables introduced by previous liberalized δ-steps cannot be used because they
are in dom(C) and the use of a free δ-variable from the input hypothesis deteriorates the result of
our proof by giving this free δ-variable an existential meaning (because it puts it into dom(C)) as
explained in Theorem 5.15. The latter does not seem to be restrictive for any reasonable applica-
tion.
All in all, when interested in proving only, the (compared to the weak version) additional choice-
condition and ordering of the strong version do not produce any overhead because they can simply
be omitted. This is interesting because choice-conditions or Hilbert’s ε-expressions are some-
times considered to make proofs quite complicated. When interested in answer “computation”,
however, they could turn out to be useful.
W.r.t. the calculus of Theorem 5.17 we thus may conclude that the strong version is generally
better than the weak version and the only overhead seems to be that we have to compute transitive
closures when checking whether a substitution σ is really a strong existential R-substitution and
when computing the strong σ-update of R. But we actually do not have to compute the transitive
closure at all, because the only essential thing is the circularity-check which can be done on a
bipartite9 graph generating the transitive closures. This checking is in the worst case linear in
|R| +
∑
σ
(
|Uσ| + |Eσ|
)
and is expected to perform at least as well as an optimally integrated version (i.e. one without
conversion of term-representation) of the linear unification algorithm of Paterson & Wegman
(1978) in the standard framework of Skolemization and unification. Note, however, that the
checking for strong existentialR-substitutions can also be implemented with any other unification
algorithm.
Not really computing the transitive closure enables another refinement that allows us to go
even beyond the fascinating strong Skolemization of Nonnengart (1996). The basic idea of Nonnengart
(1996) can be translated into our framework in the following simplified way.
Instead of proving ∀x: (A∨B) it may be advantageous to prove the stronger ∀x:A ∨ ∀x:B,
because after applications of α- and liberalized δ-rules to ∀x:A ∨ ∀x:B, resulting in
A{x7→xδA}, B{x7→x
δ
B}, the variable-conditions introduced for xδA and xδB may be smaller than
the variable-condition introduced for yδ after applying these rules to ∀x: (A∨B), resulting in
A{x7→yδ}, B{x7→yδ}, i.e. R〈{xδA}〉 and R〈{xδB}〉 may be proper subsets of R〈{yδ}〉. Therefore
the proof of ∀x:A ∨ ∀x:B may be simpler than the proof of ∀x: (A∨B). The nice aspect of
Nonnengart (1996) is that the proofs of ∀x:A and ∀x: (A∨B) can be done in parallel with-
out extra costs, such that the bigger variable-condition becomes active only if we decide that the
smaller variable-condition is not enough to prove ∀x:A and we had better prove the weaker
∀x: (A∨B).
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The disadvantage of the strong Skolemization approach of Nonnengart (1996), however,
is that we have to decide whether to prove either ∀x:A or else ∀x:B in parallel to
∀x: (A∨B). In terms of Hilbert’s ε-operator, this asymmetry can be understood from the ar-
gumentation of Nonnengart (1996), which, for some new variable z ∈ Vbound and t denoting
the term εz: (¬A{x7→z} ∧ (A ∨ x=z)), employs the logical equivalence of ∀x: (A∨B) with
∀x:A ∨ ∀x: (B{x7→t}) and then the logical equivalence of ∀x:A with ∃x: (A{x7→t}).
Now, if we do not really compute the transitive closures in our strong version, we
can prove A{x7→xδA}, B{x7→xδB} in parallel and may later decide to prove the stronger
A{x7→yδ}, B{x7→yδ} instead, simply by merging the nodes for xδA and xδB and substituting
xδA and xδB with yδ.
6 Conclusion
All in all, we have presented an easy to read combination of raising, explicit variable dependency
representation, the liberalized δ-rule, and preservation of solutions for first-order deductive the-
orem proving. Our motivation was not only to make these subjects more popular, but also to
provide the foundation for our work on inductive theorem proving (cf. Wirth (1999)) where the
preservation of solutions is indispensable.
To our knowledge10 we have presented on the one hand the first sound combination of ex-
plicit variable dependency representation and the liberalized δ-rule and on the other hand the first
framework for preservation of solutions in full first-order logic.
Finally, the described problems with the development of the strong version reveal unexpected
details on the nature of the liberalized δ-rule, and the discussion at the end of § 5 opens up several
new research directions.
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7 The Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.6
(1): Since e′ is a [strong] existential (A, R′)-valuation, Se′◦R′ [ ◦ (Se′◦R′)∗] is irreflexive [and
a wellfounded ordering]. Since R⊆R′, we have Se′◦R [ ◦ (Se′◦R)∗] ⊆ Se′◦R′ [ ◦ (Se′◦R′)∗].
Thus Se′◦R [ ◦ (Se′◦R)∗] is irreflexive [and a wellfounded ordering], too. Therefore, setting
e := e′, we get a [strong] existential (A, R)-valuation trivially satisfying the requirements.
(2): Here we denote concatenation (product) of relations ‘◦’ simply by juxtaposition and assume
it to have higher priority than any other binary operator. Let e′ be some [strong] existential
(A, R′)-valuation. Define Se := Se′Eσ ∪ Uσ and the [strong] existential (A, R)-valuation e by
(x∈Vγ, π′ ∈Se〈{x}〉 → A):
e(x)(π′) := eval(A⊎ ǫ(e′)(π) ⊎ π)(σ(x))
where π ∈ Vδ → A is an arbitrary extension of π′. For this definition to be okay, we have to prove
the following claims:
Claim 1: For y ∈ Vδ(σ(x)), the choice of π ⊇ π′ does not influence the value of π(y).
Claim 2: For x′ ∈ Vγ(σ(x)), the choice of π ⊇ π′ does not influence the value of ǫ(e′)(π)(x′).
Claim 3: For the weak version we have to show that SeR is irreflexive.
Claim 4: For the strong version we have to show that (SeR)+ is a wellfounded ordering.
Proof of Claim 1: y ∈Vδ(σ(x)) means (y, x)∈Uσ. By definition of Se we have (y, x)∈Se, i.e.
y ∈ Se〈{x}〉 = dom(π
′). Q.e.d. (Claim 1)
Proof of Claim 2: x′ ∈Vγ(σ(x)) means (x′, x)∈Eσ. Thus by definition of Se we have
Se′{(x
′, x)} ⊆ Se, i.e. Se′〈{x′}〉 ⊆ Se〈{x}〉 = dom(π′). Therefore ǫ(e′)(π)(x′) =
e′(x′)(Se′〈{x′}〉¸π) = e
′(x′)(Se′ 〈{x′}〉¸π
′). Q.e.d. (Claim 2)
Proof of Claim 3: Since SeR = Se′EσR ∪ UσR and UσR is irreflexive (as σ is an existential
R-substitution), it suffices to show irreflexivity of Se′EσR. Since R′ is the σ-update of R, this is
equal to Se′R′, which is irreflexive because e′ is an existential (A, R′)-valuation.
Q.e.d. (Claim 3)
Proof of Claim 4: Since σ is a strong existential R-substitution, (UσR)+ is a wellfounded or-
dering. Thus, if (SeR)+ = (Se′EσR ∪ UσR)+ = (UσR)+ ∪ (UσR)∗(Se′EσR(UσR)∗)+
is not a wellfounded ordering, there must be an infinite descending sequence of the
form y2i+2 (UσR)∗ y2i+1 (Se′EσR(UσR)∗)+ y2i for all i ∈ N. But then
y2i+3 (Se′EσR(UσR)
∗)
+
y2i+2 (UσR)
∗ y2i+1, which contradicts the wellfoundedness of
(Se′EσR(UσR)
∗)
+
(UσR)
∗ = (Se′EσR(UσR)
∗)
+
= (Se′R
′)+, where the latter step is due to R′
being the strong σ-update of R. The latter relation is a wellfounded ordering, however, because
e′ is a strong existential (A, R′)-valuation. Q.e.d. (Claim 4)
Now, for π ∈ Vδ → A and x ∈ Vγ we have
ǫ(e)(π)(x) = e(x)(Se〈{x}〉¸π) = eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e
′)(π) ⊎ π)(σ(x))
i.e. ǫ(e)(π) = σ ◦ eval(A⊎ ǫ(e′)(π) ⊎ π). Q.e.d. (Lemma 3.6)
Proof of Lemma 4.2
This a trivial consequence of Lemma 3.6(1). Q.e.d. (Lemma 4.2)
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Proof of Lemma 4.5 (1), (2), (3), and (4) are trivial. Note that (5) is a trivial consequence of
Lemma 3.6(1).
(6a): Suppose that G0σ is R′-valid in A. Then there is some existential (A, R′)-valuation e′ such
that G0σ is (e′,A)-valid. Then, by Lemma 3.6(2), there is some existential (A, R)-valuation e
such that for all π ∈ Vδ → A: ǫ(e)(π) = σ ◦ eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e′)(π) ⊎ π). Moreover, for y ∈ Vδ we
have: π(y) = eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e′)(π) ⊎ π)(y),
i.e. ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π = (σ ⊎ Vδ¸id) ◦ eval(A⊎ ǫ(e′)(π) ⊎ π).
Thus, for any formula B, we have
eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π)(B) =
eval(A ⊎ ((σ ⊎ Vδ¸id) ◦ eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e
′)(π) ⊎ π)))(B) =
eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e′)(π) ⊎ π)(Bσ),
the latter step being due to the Substitution-Lemma.
Thus, for any set of sequents G′:
(e,A)-validity of G′ is logically equivalent to (e′,A)-validity of G′σ . (:§)
Especially, G0 is (e,A)-valid. Thus, G0 is R-valid in A.
(6b): Let e′ be some existential (A, R′)-valuation and suppose that G1σ is (e′,A)-valid. Let e be
the existential (A, R)-valuation given by Lemma 3.6(2). Then, by (§) in the proof of (6a), G1 is
(e,A)-valid. By assumption, G0 R-reduces to G1. Thus, G0 is (e,A)-valid. By (§) in the proof
of (6a), this means that G0σ is (e′,A)-valid. Q.e.d. (Lemma 4.5)
Proof of Theorem 4.9
Since AX is Vγ×Vδ-valid, t is closed, and R ⊆ Vγ×Vδ, by Lemma 4.5(5), Goals({t}) is R-valid.
Since (Γ, t)∈F and (F,R) satisfies the invariant condition, {Γ} R-reduces to Goals({t}). All
in all, by Lemma 4.5(1), Γ is R-valid. Q.e.d. (Theorem 4.9)
Proof of Theorem 4.10
(∅, ∅) trivially satisfies the invariant condition. For the iteration steps, let (Γ ′′, t′′) ∈ F ′. Assuming
the invariant condition for (F,R), we have to show that {Γ ′′} R′-reduces to Goals({t′′}).
Hypothesizing: In case of (Γ ′′, t′′)∈F, {Γ ′′} R-reduces to Goals({t′′}) by assumption, and
then, due to R⊆R′ and Lemma 4.5(5), {Γ ′′} R′-reduces to Goals({t′′}). Otherwise we have
(Γ ′′, t′′)= (Γ, t). Then {Γ ′′} = {Γ} = Goals({t}) = Goals({t′′}). Thus, by Lemma 4.5(2),
{Γ ′′} R′-reduces to Goals({t′′}).
Expansion: In case of (Γ ′′, t′′)∈F, {Γ ′′}R-reduces to Goals({t′′}) by assumption, and then, due
to R⊆R′ and Lemma 4.5(5), {Γ ′′} R′-reduces to Goals({t′′}). Otherwise we have (Γ ′′, t′′) =
(Γ, t′). Since Goals({t})\{∆} ⊆ Goals({t′}), by Lemma 4.5(2), Goals({t})\{∆} R′-reduces
to Goals({t′}). Thus, since by assumption {∆} R′-reduces to a subset of Goals({t′}), by Lem-
ma 4.5(4) Goals({t}) R′-reduces to Goals({t′}). Moreover, due to (Γ, t)∈F, by assump-
tion {Γ} R-reduces to Goals({t}). Thus, by R⊆R′ and Lemma 4.5(5), {Γ} R′-reduces to
Goals({t}). Thus, since Goals({t})R′-reduces to Goals({t′}), by Lemma 4.5(3) {Γ}R′-reduces
to Goals({t′}), i.e. {Γ ′′} R′-reduces to Goals({t′′}).
Instantiation: There is some (Γ, t) ∈ F such that (Γ, t)σ = (Γ ′′, t′′). By assumption, {Γ}
R-reduces to Goals({t}). By Lemma 4.5(6), {Γσ} R′-reduces to Goals({t})σ, i.e. {Γ ′′} R′-
reduces to Goals({t′′}). Q.e.d. (Theorem 4.10)
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Proof of Theorem 4.11
Let A be an arbitrary Σ-structure (Σ-algebra). We only prove the first example of each kind of
rule to be a sub-rule of the Expansion rule and leave the rest as an exercise.
α-rule: We have to show that {Γ (A∨B) Π} ∅-reduces to {A B Γ Π} in A. This is
trivial, however, because (e,A)-validity of the two sets is logically equivalent for each existential
(A, ∅)-valuation e.
β-rule: We have to show that {Γ (A∧B) Π} ∅-reduces to {A Γ Π, B Γ Π} inA. This is
trivial, however, because (e,A)-validity of the two sets is logically equivalent for each existential
(A, ∅)-valuation e.
γ-rule: We have to show that {Γ ∃x:A Π} ∅-reduces to {A{x7→xγ} Γ ∃x:A Π} in A.
This is the case, however, because (e,A)-validity of the two sets is logically equivalent for each
existential (A, ∅)-valuation e. The direction from left to right is given because the former sequent
is a sub-sequent of the latter. The other direction, which is the only one we actually have to show
here, is also clear because (π, e,A)-validity of A{x7→xγ} implies (π, e,A)-validity of ∃x:A.
Although this is clear, we should be a little more explicit here because the standard semantic
definition of ∃ (cf. e.g. Wirth (1997), p. 188) does not use free γ-variables and is somewhat more
complicated than it could be in terms of free γ-variables. Moreover, in the note above the theorem
we remarked that the restriction on xγ not occurring in the former sequent is not really necessary.
Thus, in order to be more explicit here, assume that the latter sequent is (e,A)-valid for some
existential (A, ∅)-valuation e. Let π ∈ Vδ → A. We have to show that the former sequent is
(π, e,A)-valid. If this is not the case, A{x7→xγ} must be (π, e,A)-valid. Let yδ ∈ Vδ\Vδ(A).
Then, since A{x7→yδ}{yδ7→xγ} is equal to A{x7→xγ}, we know that A{x7→yδ}{yδ7→xγ} is
valid in A⊎ǫ(e)(π)⊎π. Then, by the Substitution-Lemma, A{x7→yδ} is valid in A⊎ǫ(e)(π)⊎π′
for π′ ∈ Vδ → A given by Vδ\{yδ}¸π′ := Vδ\{yδ}¸π and π′(yδ) := ǫ(e)(π)(xγ). By the standard
semantic definition of ∃ and since quantification on x cannot occur in A (as ∃x:A is a formula in
our restricted sense, cf. § 1.4), this means that ∃x:(A{x7→yδ}{yδ7→x}) is valid in A⊎ ǫ(e)(π)⊎π.
Since yδ does not occur in A, this formula is equal to ∃x:A, which means that the former sequent
is (π, e,A)-valid as was to be shown.
δ-rule: We have to show that {Γ ∀x:A Π} R′′-reduces to {A{x7→xδ} Γ Π} in A for
R′′ = Vγ(A, ΓΠ)× {x
δ}. Assume that the latter sequent is (e,A)-valid for some existential
R′′-valuation e. Let π ∈ Vδ → A. We have to show that the former sequent is (π, e,A)-valid.
If some formula in ΓΠ is (π, e,A)-valid, then the former sequent is (π, e,A)-valid, too. Oth-
erwise, ΓΠ is not only invalid in A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π, but also in A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π′ for all
π′ ∈ Vδ → A with Vδ\{xδ}¸π′ = Vδ\{xδ}¸π, simply because xδ does not occur in ΓΠ . Because of
Vγ(ΓΠ)× {x
δ} ⊆ R′′, we know that ΓΠ must be even invalid in A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π′) ⊎ π′. Since the
latter sequent is assumed to be (e,A)-valid, this means that A{x7→xδ} is (π′, e,A)-valid. Because
of Vγ(A{x7→xδ}) × {xδ} = Vγ(A) × {xδ} ⊆ R′′, we know that A{x7→xδ} must be even valid
in A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π′ for all π′ ∈ Vδ → A with Vδ\{xδ}¸π′ = Vδ\{xδ}¸π. By the standard semantic
definition of ∀ (cf. e.g. Wirth (1997), p. 188) and since quantification on x cannot occur in A (as
∀x:A is a formula in our restricted sense, cf. § 1.4), this means that ∀x:(A{x7→xδ}{xδ7→x}) is
valid inA⊎ǫ(e)(π)⊎π. Since xδ does not occur in A, this formula is equal to ∀x:A, which means
that the former sequent is (π, e,A)-valid as was to be shown. Q.e.d. (Theorem 4.11)
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Proof of Lemma 5.4
Since in Doornbos &al. (1997) Theorem 62 and especially its proof (which is used to illustrate
the application of the very special framework of that paper) are not easy to read, we give an
easier proof here that requires fewer set theoretical preconditions and uses induction only on
ω. It proceeds by showing the existence of a refutational element in a nonempty set of infinite
descending sequences.
Set F := dom(A) ∪ ran(A) ∪ dom(B) ∪ ran(B). We show that C := { t : N→ F |
∀i∈N. ti (A∪B) ti+1 } is empty. Otherwise we can choose s ∈ C and families (Di)i∈N and
(Ei)i∈N+ of subsets of F inductively in the following way:
D0 := { t0 | t∈C }. Choose s0 such that it is B-irreducible in D0, i.e. such that s0 ∈D0 and
there is no t′ ∈ D0 such that s0 B t′.
For n ∈ N+: Dn := { tn | t∈C ∧ ∀i≺ n. ti= si ∧ sn−1 A tn }. En := { tn |
t∈C ∧ ∀i≺n. ti= si ∧ sn−1 B tn }. If En is nonempty we choose sn from En. Otherwise,
we choose sn to be B-irreducible in Dn.
Since s ∈ C andA is terminating, there is some minimaln ∈ N with sn B sn+1. We have n≻ 0,
because otherwise s0 B s1 ∈ D0 contradicts the choice of s0. Thus, sn−1 (A\B) sn B sn+1.
Since sn−1 (A\B) sn, we know that sn was chosen not from En, but B-irreducible in Dn. Due
to A◦B ⊆ A ∪ B◦(A ∪B)∗ we get two possible cases now.
sn−1 A sn+1: Then s0 . . . sn−1sn+1sn+2 . . . is an element of C. Thus, sn+1∈Dn. Due to
sn B sn+1, this contradicts sn being B-irreducible in Dn.
sn−1 (B◦(A ∪ B)
∗) sn+1: Then there are some m ∈ N and some
s0 . . . sn−1u0 . . . umsn+2sn+3 . . . in C with sn−1 B u0 and um= sn+1 . Thus, u0∈En, i.e. En
is not empty. But this contradicts the fact that sn was not chosen from En. Q.e.d. (Lemma 5.4)
Proof of Lemma 5.5
Here we denote concatenation (product) of relations ‘◦’ simply by juxtaposition and assume it to
have higher priority than any other binary operator.
Claim 1: R′<′ ⊆ R′.
Proof of Claim 1: Since C is a (R,<)-choice-condition, we have R< ⊆ R. Thus,
R′<′ = EσR(UσR)
∗(<(UσR)
∗ ∪ (UσR)
+) = Eσ(RUσ)
∗R<(UσR)
∗ ∪ EσR(UσR)
∗(UσR)
+ ⊆
Eσ(RUσ)
∗R(UσR)
∗ ∪ EσR(UσR)
∗(UσR)
+ = EσR(UσR)
∗(UσR)
∗ ∪ EσR(UσR)
+ =
EσR(UσR)
∗ = R′. Q.e.d. (Claim 1)
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Claim 2: <′ is a wellfounded ordering on Vδ.
Proof of Claim 2: Since C is a (R,<)-choice-condition, we know that < is a wellfounded order-
ing on Vδ and R< ⊆ R.
Thus UσR< ⊆ UσR,
(UσR)
+< = (UσR)
∗UσR< ⊆ (UσR)
∗UσR = (UσR)
+,
and <(UσR)∗< = << ∪ <(UσR)+< ⊆ < ∪ <(UσR)+ = <(UσR)∗.
Since σ is a strong existential R-substitution, we know that (UσR)+ is a is a wellfounded ordering
on Vδ. By Lemma 5.4 (setting A := <−1 and B := (UσR)−1) by the first of the above contain-
ments, we know that <−1 ∪ (UσR)−1 is terminating, which (due to <′ = <(UσR)∗ ∪ (UσR)+ )
means that >′ is terminating, too. Finally <′ is also transitive, since by the above containments:
<(UσR)
∗<(UσR)
∗ ⊆ <(UσR)
∗(UσR)
∗ = <(UσR)
∗ ⊆ <′
and <(UσR)∗(UσR)+ = <(UσR)+ ⊆ <(UσR)∗ ⊆ <′
and (UσR)+<(UσR)∗ ⊆ (UσR)+(UσR)∗ = (UσR)+ ⊆ <′
and (UσR)+(UσR)+ ⊆ (UσR)+ ⊆ <′. Q.e.d. (Claim 2)
Claim 3: For all yδ ∈ dom(C ′): For all zδ ∈ Vδ(C ′(yδ))\{yδ}: zδ <′ yδ.
Proof of Claim 3: Let zδ ∈ Vδ(C ′(yδ))\{yδ}. By the definition of C ′ this means
zδ∈Vδ(C(y
δ))\{yδ} or there is some uγ ∈ Vγ(C(yδ)) with zδ Uσ uγ. Since C is a (R,<)-
choice-condition, we have zδ < yδ or zδ Uσ uγ R yδ. Thus, by definition of <′ we have zδ <′ yδ.
Q.e.d. (Claim 3)
Claim 4: For all yδ ∈ dom(C ′): For all uγ ∈ Vγ(C ′(yδ)): uγ R′ yδ.
Proof of Claim 4: Let uγ ∈ Vδ(C ′(yδ)). By the definition of C ′ there is some vγ ∈ Vγ(C(yδ)) with
uγ Eσ v
γ. Since C is a (R,<)-choice-condition, we have vγ R yδ. Thus, by definition of R′ we
have uγ R′ yδ. Q.e.d. (Claim 4) Q.e.d. (Lemma 5.5)
Proof of Lemma 5.8
Since G is C ′-strongly R′-valid in A, there is some strong existential (A, R′)-valuation e′ such
that G is C ′-strongly (e′,A)-valid. Let e be the strong existential (A, R)-valuation with ǫ(e) =
ǫ(e′) given by Lemma 3.6(1) due to R⊆R′. Let π be (e,A)-compatible with C. It suffices to
show that G is (π, e,A)-valid. Since the notion of (e,A)-compatibility does not depend on the
precise form of e besides ǫ(e), we know that π is also (e′,A)-compatible with C. Due to C ′⊆C,
π is also (e′,A)-compatible with C ′. Finally, since G is C ′-strongly (e′,A)-valid, we conclude
that G is (π, e′,A)-valid, i.e. (π, e,A)-valid. Q.e.d. (Lemma 5.8)
Proof of Lemma 5.10
(1): Since C is a (R,<)-choice-condition, we know that < is a wellfounded ordering on Vδ and
R ⊆ Vγ×Vδ. Moreover, we have Se ⊆ Vδ×Vγ and Vγ∩Vδ = ∅. Thus, if ⊳ is not wellfounded,
then there is an infinitely descending sequence of the form y2i+2 Se y2i+1 (R ◦ ≤) y2i for all
i ∈ N. Since C is a (R,<)-choice-condition, we know that (R ◦<) ⊆ R. Thus, we get
y2i+2 Se y2i+1 R y2i for all i ∈ N. This means that (Se◦R)+ is not wellfounded, which contradicts
the assumption that e is a strong existential (A, R)-valuation.
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(2): Let π ∈ (Vδ\dom(C))→ A. By noetherian induction on ⊳ and with the help of a choice
function we can define some ̺ ∈ Vfree → A in the following way: For x ∈ Vγ: ̺(x) :=
e(x)(Se〈{x}〉¸̺). For x ∈ Vδ\dom(C): ̺(x) := π(x). For x ∈ dom(C): ̺(x) := a, where
a is an element of the universe of A such that, if possible, C(x) is not (Vδ¸̺, e,A)-valid. For
this definition to be okay, we have to show, for each x ∈ Vfree, that ̺(x) is defined in terms of
⊳〈{x}〉¸̺. In case of x∈Vγ, this is obvious because Se⊆⊳. In case of x∈Vδ\dom(C), this
is trivial. Thus, let x ∈ dom(C). Since C is a (R,<)-choice-condition, we have zδ < x for
all zδ ∈ Vδ(C(x))\{x} and uγ R x for all uγ ∈ Vγ(C(x)). Thus, since R⊆⊳, by induc-
tion hypothesis, (Vδ¸̺, e,A)-validity of C(x) means validity of C(x) in A⊎̺. Moreover, since
<⊆⊳, we know that ̺(x) is defined in terms of Vfree(C(x))\{x}¸̺ ⊆ ⊳〈{x}〉¸̺. Finally, we define
ξpi := dom(C)¸̺.
For showing that π⊎ξpi is (e,A)-compatible with C, let yδ ∈ dom(C) and suppose that C(yδ)
is (π⊎ξpi, e,A)-valid, i.e. (Vδ¸̺, e,A)-valid. Thus, by definition of ̺, we know that, for all η ∈
{yδ} → A, C(yδ) is (Vδ\{yδ}¸̺⊎η, e,A)-valid, i.e. (π⊎Vδ\{yδ}¸ξpi⊎η, e,A)-valid. The rest is trivial.
(3a): Let ξ be given as in (2). Define e′ via
e′(x)(τ) := ξpi(ς
−1(x)) (x∈ ran(ς), τ ∈ ((Vδ\dom(C)) ∩⊳〈{ς−1(x)}〉)→ A, where π ∈
(Vδ\dom(C))→ A an arbitrary extension of τ ) and
e′(x)(τ) := e(x)(Se〈{x}〉¸(π⊎ξpi)) (x∈Vγ\ran(ς), τ ∈ ((Vδ\dom(C)) ∩⊳〈{x}〉)→ A, where
π ∈ (Vδ\dom(C))→ A an arbitrary extension of τ ).
Note that this definition is okay because the choice of π does not matter: For the first π this
is directly given by (2). For the second π we have: Se〈{x}〉¸π ⊆ ⊳〈{x}〉¸π ⊆ τ, and, for
y ∈ dom(C) ∩ Se〈{x}〉, by (2), ξpi(y) is already determined by ⊳〈{y}〉¸π ⊆ ⊳〈{x}〉¸π ⊆ τ.
Then Se′ = Vδ\dom(C)¸id ◦
( ⋃
y∈ran(ς)
⊳〈{ς−1(y)}〉 × {y} ∪
⋃
x∈Vγ\ran(ς)
⊳〈{x}〉 × {x}
)
.
Due to R′ = Vγ\ran(ς)¸id◦R ∪
⋃
y∈ran(ς)
{y} × 〈{ς−1(y)}〉E ∪ Vγ×dom(C), we get
Se′ ◦R
′ ⊆ Vδ\dom(C)¸id ◦( ⋃
y∈ran(ς)
⊳〈{ς−1(y)}〉 × 〈{ς−1(y)}〉E ∪
⋃
x∈Vγ\ran(ς)
(
⊳〈{x}〉×{x}
)
◦R ∪ Vδ×dom(C)
)
⊆ Vδ\dom(C)¸id ◦ ( ⊳ ∪ Vδ×dom(C) ). Thus, (Se′◦R′)
+ is a wellfounded ordering because ⊳
is wellfounded by (1). This means that e′ is a strong existential (A, R′)-valuation. It now suffices
to show that Gς is (τ, e′,A)-valid for all τ ∈ Vδ → A. Set π := Vδ\dom(C)¸τ . We get the following
equalities for the below reasons:
eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e′)(τ) ⊎ τ )(Gς) =
eval(A ⊎ ((Vγ¸id ⊎ Vδ\dom(ς)¸id ⊎ ς) ◦ eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e
′)(τ) ⊎ τ )))(G) =
eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e′)(τ) ⊎ Vδ\dom(ς)¸τ ⊎ (ς◦(ǫ(e
′)(τ))))(G) =
eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π ⊎ ξpi) ⊎ Vδ\dom(ς)¸τ ⊎ dom(ς)¸ξpi)(G) =
eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π ⊎ ξpi) ⊎ π ⊎ ξpi)(G) =
TRUE
First: By the Substitution-Lemma. Second: By distributing ◦ over ∪. Third: Since, for
x ∈ Vγ(G) we have x ∈ Vγ\ran(ς) and thus ǫ(e′)(τ)(x) = ǫ(e)(π ⊎ ξpi)(x). Moreover, since,
for x ∈ dom(ς), ǫ(e′)(τ)(ς(x)) = ξpi(ς−1(ς(x))) = ξpi(x), we get ς ◦ (ǫ(e′)(τ)) = dom(ς)¸ξpi.
Fourth: By noting that dom(ς) = Vδ(G) ∩ dom(C). Fifth: Because π⊎ξpi is (e,A)-compatible
with C (by (2)) and G is C-strongly (e,A)-valid.
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(3b): When G is C-strongly R-valid inA, then there is some strong existential (R,A)-valuation e
such that G is C-strongly (e,A)-valid. By (3a), Gς is ∅-strongly R′-valid in A. Since
Vγ\ran(ς)¸R⊆R
′′⊆R′, by Lemma 5.8, Gς is ∅-strongly Vγ\ran(ς)¸R-valid and ∅-strongly R′′-valid
in A. Q.e.d. (Lemma 5.10)
Proof of Lemma 5.12
(1), (2), (3), and (4) are trivial.
(5): Let e′ be a strong existential (A, R′)-valuation and π be (e′,A)-compatible with C ′ such that
G1 is (π, e′,A)-valid. Let e be the strong existential (A, R)-valuation with ǫ(e) = ǫ(e′) given
by Lemma 3.6(1) due to R⊆R′. Then π is (e,A)-compatible with C ′, and G1 is (π, e,A)-valid.
Moreover, due to C⊆C ′, π is (e,A)-compatible with C. Thus, since G0 strongly (R,C)-reduces
to G1, also G0 is (π, e,A)-valid. This also means that G0 is (π, e′,A)-valid as was to be shown.
(6a): Suppose that G0σ is C ′-strongly R′-valid in A. Then there is some strong existen-
tial (A, R′)-valuation e′ such that G0σ is C ′-strongly (e′,A)-valid. Then, by Lemma 3.6(2),
there is some strong existential (A, R)-valuation e such that for all π ∈ Vδ → A: ǫ(e)(π) =
σ ◦ eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e′)(π) ⊎ π). Moreover, for y ∈ Vδ we have: π(y) = eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e′)(π) ⊎ π)(y),
i.e. ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π = (σ ⊎ Vδ¸id) ◦ eval(A⊎ ǫ(e′)(π) ⊎ π).
Thus, for any formula B, we have
eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π)(B) =
eval(A ⊎ ((σ ⊎ Vδ¸id) ◦ eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e
′)(π) ⊎ π)))(B) =
eval(A ⊎ ǫ(e′)(π) ⊎ π)(Bσ),
the latter step being due to the Substitution-Lemma.
Thus, for any set of sequents G′ and any π ∈ Vδ → A:
(π, e,A)-validity of G′ is logically equivalent to (π, e′,A)-validity of G′σ. (:§1)
Especially, for any π ∈ Vδ → A:
π is (e,A)-compatible with C iff π is (e′,A)-compatible with C ′. (:§2)
Thus, for any set of sequents G′:
G′ is C-strongly (e,A)-valid iff G′σ is C ′-strongly (e′,A)-valid.
Especially, G0 is C-strongly (e,A)-valid. Thus, G0 is C-strongly R-valid in A.
(6b): Let e′ be some strong existential (A, R′)-valuation, π be (e′,A)-compatible with C ′, and
suppose that G1σ is (π, e′,A)-valid. Let e be the existential (A, R)-valuation given by Lem-
ma 3.6(2). Then, by (§2) in the proof of (6a), π is (e,A)-compatible with C, and, by (§1) in the
proof of (6a), G1 is (π, e,A)-valid. By assumption, G0 strongly (R,C)-reduces to G1. Thus, G0
is (π, e,A)-valid, too. By (§1) in the proof of (6a), this means that G0σ is (π, e′,A)-valid as was
to be shown. Q.e.d. (Lemma 5.12)
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Proof of Theorem 5.15
Since AX is ∅-strongly Vγ×Vδ-valid, t is closed, R ⊆ Vγ×Vδ, and ∅ ⊆ C, by Lemma 5.8,
Goals({t}) is C-strongly R-valid. Since (Γ, t)∈F and (F,C,R,<) satisfies the invariant con-
dition, {Γ} strongly (R,C)-reduces to Goals({t}). Then, by Lemma 5.12(1), Γ is C-strongly
R-valid. Finally, by Lemma 5.10(3b), Γς is ∅-strongly R′-valid and ∅-strongly Vγ\ran(ς)¸R-valid.
Q.e.d. (Theorem 5.15)
Proof of Theorem 5.16
(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) trivially satisfies the strong invariant condition. For the iteration steps, let (Γ ′′, t′′) ∈
F ′. Assuming the strong invariant condition for (F,C,R,<), we have to show that C ′ is a (R′, <′
)-choice-condition and that {Γ ′′} strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to Goals({t′′}).
Hypothesizing: Due to the assumed R◦< ⊆ R and the required R′′◦< ⊆ R′ = R∪R′′,
we have R′ ◦ < = (R∪R′′) ◦ < ⊆ R∪R′′ = R′. Thus, C is a (R′, <)-choice-condition.
Moreover, due to C ′=C and <′=<, (C ′, R′, <′) is an extension of (C,R,<). In case
of (Γ ′′, t′′)∈F, {Γ ′′} (R,C)-reduces to Goals({t′′}) by assumption, and then, due to Lem-
ma 5.12(5), {Γ ′′} strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to Goals({t′′}). Otherwise we have (Γ ′′, t′′) = (Γ, t).
Then {Γ ′′} = {Γ} = Goals({t}) = Goals({t′′}). Thus, by Lemma 5.12(2), {Γ ′′} strongly
(R′, C ′)-reduces to Goals({t′′}).
Expansion: In case of (Γ ′′, t′′)∈F, {Γ ′′} (R,C)-reduces to Goals({t′′}) by assump-
tion, and then, due to (C ′, R′, <′) being an extension of (C,R,<) and Lemma 5.12(5),
{Γ ′′} strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to Goals({t′′}). Otherwise we have (Γ ′′, t′′) = (Γ, t′). Since
Goals({t})\{∆} ⊆ Goals({t′}), by Lemma 5.12(2), Goals({t})\{∆} strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces
to Goals({t′}). Thus, since by assumption {∆} strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to a subset of
Goals({t′}), by Lemma 5.12(4) Goals({t}) strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to Goals({t′}). More-
over, due to (Γ, t)∈F, by assumption {Γ} strongly (R,C)-reduces to Goals({t}). Thus,
by Lemma 5.12(5), {Γ} strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to Goals({t}). Thus, since Goals({t})
strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to Goals({t′}), by Lemma 5.12(3), {Γ} strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to
Goals({t′}), i.e. {Γ ′′} strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to Goals({t′′}).
Instantiation: By Lemma 5.5, C ′ is a (R′, <′)-choice-condition. There is some (Γ, t) ∈ F such
that (Γ, t)σ = (Γ ′′, t′′). By assumption, {Γ} strongly (R,C)-reduces to Goals({t}). By Lem-
ma 5.12(6b), {Γσ} strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to Goals({t})σ, i.e. {Γ ′′} strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces
to Goals({t′′}). Q.e.d. (Theorem 5.16)
Proof of Theorem 5.17
Let A be an arbitrary Σ-structure (Σ-algebra). We only prove the first example of each kind of
rule to be a sub-rule of the Expansion rule and leave the rest as an exercise.
α-rule: We have to show that {Γ (A∨B)Π} strongly (R,C)-reduces to {AB Γ Π} inA. This is
trivial, however, because (π, e,A)-validity of the two sets is logically equivalent for each strong
existential (A, R)-valuation e and π ∈ Vδ → A.
β-rule: We have to show that {Γ (A∧B) Π} strongly (R,C)-reduces to {A Γ Π, B Γ Π}
in A. This is trivial, however, because (π, e,A)-validity of the two sets is logically equivalent for
each strong existential (A, R)-valuation e and π ∈ Vδ → A.
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γ-rule: We have to show that {Γ ∃x:A Π} strongly (R,C)-reduces to {A{x7→xγ} Γ ∃x:A Π}
in A. This is the case, however, because (π, e,A)-validity of the two sets is logically equivalent
for each strong existential (A, R)-valuation e and π ∈ Vδ → A. The direction from left to right
is given because the former sequent is a sub-sequent of the latter. The other direction, which is
the only one we actually have to show here, is also clear because (π, e,A)-validity of A{x7→xγ}
implies (π, e,A)-validity of ∃x:A. Although this is clear, we should be a little more explicit
here because the standard semantic definition of ∃ (cf. e.g. Wirth (1997), p. 188) does not use
free γ-variables and is somewhat more complicated than it could be in terms of free γ-variables.
Moreover, in the note above the theorem we remarked that the restriction on xγ not occurring in
the former sequent is not really necessary. Thus, in order to be more explicit here, assume that the
latter sequent is (π, e,A)-valid for some strong existential (A, R)-valuation e and some π that is
(e,A)-compatible withC. We have to show that the former sequent is (π, e,A)-valid. If this is not
the case, A{x7→xγ} must be (π, e,A)-valid. Let yδ ∈ Vδ\Vδ(A). Then, since A{x7→yδ}{yδ7→xγ}
is equal to A{x7→xγ}, we know that A{x7→yδ}{yδ7→xγ} is valid in A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π. Then,
by the Substitution-Lemma, A{x7→yδ} is valid in A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π′ for π′ ∈ Vδ → A given
by Vδ\{yδ}¸π′ := Vδ\{yδ}¸π and π′(yδ) := ǫ(e)(π)(xγ). By the standard semantic definition of
∃ and since quantification on x cannot occur in A (as ∃x:A is a formula in our restricted sense,
cf. § 1.4), this means that ∃x:(A{x7→yδ}{yδ7→x}) is valid in A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π. Since yδ does not
occur in A, this formula is equal to ∃x:A, which means that the former sequent is (π, e,A)-valid
as was to be shown.
δ-rule: Firstly, we have to show thatC ′ is a (R′, <′)-choice-condition. Since xδ /∈ Vδ(A)∪dom(<)
and < is a wellfounded ordering, <′ := < ∪ ≤〈Vδ(A)〉 × {xδ} is a wellfounded ordering
with xδ /∈ dom(<′), too. Therefore, R′′ ◦ <′ = ∅, and then R′ ◦ <′ = (R ∪ R′′) ◦ <′ =
R ◦ <′ = R ◦ (< ∪<′′) = (R ◦<) ∪ (R ◦<′′) ⊆ R ∪ R′′ = R′; where the inclusion is due
to the following: first, we have R ◦ < ⊆ R because C is a (R,<)-choice-condition; second,
in case of z0 R z1 <′′ z2 we have z2 = xδ and there is some z′ ∈ Vδ(A) with z1 ≤ z′;
then, again by R ◦ < ⊆ R, we get z0 R z′, i.e. z0 R′′ xδ = z2. Since < ⊆ <′, R ⊆ R′,
C ′ = C ∪ {(xδ, A{x7→xδ})}, Vδ(C
′(xδ))\{xδ} = Vδ(A{x7→x
δ})\{xδ} = Vδ(A)\{x
δ} = Vδ(A) ⊆
<′〈{xδ}〉, and Vγ(C ′(xδ)) = Vγ(A{x7→xδ}) = Vγ(A) ⊆ R′〈{xδ}〉, the remaining requirements for
C ′ to be a (R′, <′)-choice-condition are easily checked.
Secondly, we have to show that {Γ ∀x:A Π} strongly (R′, C ′)-reduces to {A{x7→xδ} Γ Π}
in A. Assume that the latter sequent is (π, e,A)-valid for some strong existential R′-valuation
e and some π that is (e,A)-compatible with C ′. We have to show that the former sequent is
(π, e,A)-valid. If some formula in ΓΠ is (π, e,A)-valid, then the former sequent is (π, e,A)-
valid, too. Otherwise, this means that A{x7→xδ} is (π, e,A)-valid. Since π is (e,A)-compatible
with C ′, A{x7→xδ} is (π′, e,A)-valid for all π′ ∈ Vδ → A with Vδ\{xδ}¸π′ = Vδ\{xδ}¸π. Since
Vγ(A{x7→x
δ})× {xδ} = Vγ(A)× {x
δ} ⊆ R′, we know that A{x7→xδ} is even valid in A ⊎
ǫ(e)(π)⊎π′ for all π′ ∈ Vδ → A with Vδ\{xδ}¸π′ = Vδ\{xδ}¸π. By the standard semantic definition
of ∀ (cf. e.g. Wirth (1997), p. 188) and since quantification on x cannot occur in A (as ∀x:A is
a formula in our restricted sense, cf. § 1.4), this means that ∀x:(A{x7→xδ}{xδ7→x}) is valid in
A ⊎ ǫ(e)(π) ⊎ π. Since xδ does not occur in A, this formula is equal to ∀x:A, which means that
the former sequent is (π, e,A)-valid as was to be shown. Q.e.d. (Theorem 5.17)
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